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Legal education is not a spectator sport. Discussions of legal education tend towards 
the political, the practical and the methodological and not towards the theoretical or 
the analytical. As a subject of study it is often thought of as weak, unrigorous or 
worse still "sociological". It somehow does not seem to have the power or the bite of 
substantive areas of law or of legal research.. This paper takes a small, but hopefully 
firm, step in the direction of change. The thesis argued is that University Legal 
Education at a time of enormous change in the legal profession and in legal education 
itself may have lost its way. 
 
Whilst it was clear that legal education was really about preparing people for the legal 
profession, the mission of undergraduate legal education was more certain. Until a 
few years ago, just over 60% of law graduates went on to qualify for the profession. 
But of the 8,756 law graduates produced in l995 only some 3,700 will find places to 
qualify as practising lawyers, other such places will be filled by non-lawyers. This 
represents about 42% of all law graduates. Overall therefore, training for the legal 
profession has become a minority interest for undergraduate teaching. It therefore 
becomes less obvious what needs to be taught in legal education and how it should be 
taught. 
 
The Relaxation of Professional Control 
 
Three different attempts were made in the decade leading up to 1995 to change the 
rules governing acceptance by the legal professions of "qualifying law degrees". In 
retrospect these changes appear as a progressive liberalisation of the ingredients of a 
qualifying law degree, but at the time, from the perspectives of the university law 
schools, negotiations seemed to be much more about issues of power and importance 
in the relationship between the professions and the university. In 1996, when ACLEC 
published its First Report on Legal Education, it proposed the ultimate liberalisation - 
trusting universities to produce appropriate, and responsible courses, playing their 
proper role in the production of legal professionals. It remains to be seen whether this 
approach is accepted by the Law Society and the Bar Council. 
 
It was not so much that the universities had won any battle, or war, with the 
professions. It was largely the question of numbers already mentioned. The 
professions must clearly become less able to exert their influence on the ingredients of 
a law degree when such a small proportion of law graduates can now proceed into 
practice. 
 
One might have expected university law schools to be ecstatic at the likely prospect of 
a much more open regime. One might have hoped for the intellectual imagination to 
run free, for innovative programmes and approaches to begin to developed, for whole 
new areas of law to be opened up and for different law schools to characterise a range 
of different approaches to legal education. Interestingly, so far almost the reverse has 
occurred. University law schools have begun to look inwardly, in consideration of 
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what ought to be the "core" of any law degree. Perhaps the two Funding Council 
processes of TQA and RAE (see below) have pushed law schools into a more 
standardised approach, conforming to a presumed understanding of what is necessary 
to succeed in the funding competition. Perhaps exciting and imaginative courses are 
assumed to be more expensive or just more awkward for already hard-worked 
educators bowing under the pressure of larger student numbers, less student certainty 
over careers, relatively poor salaries for the academic staff and the constant pressure 
to publish. 
 
Legal education is progressively being "released" from the hegemony of the 
professional bodies. They are much less prescriptive about both content and method 
of undergraduate legal education and what constitutes a qualifying Law Degree. 
Indeed, in some cases the professional bodies have recently appeared to be more 
liberal than some of the University Law Schools themselves in their approach to 
teaching and assessment. But how should the universities act now? Having always 
been able just to react to the professional bodies, we will now have to think for 
ourselves. 
 
A thousand different flowers are not ready to bloom and a whole set of new, 
untrammelled approaches, subjects, teaching systems, programmes, are not appearing. 
 
Undergraduate legal education is beginning to look somewhat purposeless, or at least 
unclear of purpose. Little Bo Peep seems to have lost her sheep and does not know 
where to find them? Should the educators of undergraduate lawyers be looking 
towards the rest of the Academy for guidance? Should they be looking to the 
discipline of education more generally for guidance? Will they best be able to provide 
guidance for themselves from within? Or is the profession still an important model, 
lodestar, provider of meaning and generator of purpose. 
 
This paper will consider each of these in turn in order to discover what messages each 
of them have for legal education, what value may already have been taken on board 
from each and plot the usefulness of each as a guide as to where to go in the future. 





What has law gained from the rest of the Academy? What is there yet to gain? And is 
it here that the law should look for its main guidance? 
 
Much was happening within the university world during the last decade. There were 
pressures to take on much larger numbers of students into law schools, especially in 
the new university sector. With the collapse of the "binary divide" all Polytechnics 
became Universities. Many law departments had doubled their intake of students 
during the last decade whilst not making similar adjustments to numbers of staff, 
library facilities etc. At the same time the amount of money available in general to 
universities dropped considerably on a per capita basis. These changes would be 
bound to affect the learning environment. Although, in the event, they began to 
encourage greater student participation in learning, this would have to involve a 
smaller amount of staff time per student. 
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In addition, new systems for quality assessment both of the research work carried out 
in universities (Research Assessment Exercise "RAE") and of the teaching (Teaching 
Quality Assessment "TQA"), provided new pressures. Although most law faculties 
would feel it was important to be seen as excellent teachers, the real money seemed to 
flow from the research assessment exercise. It is therefore possible that university law 
departments might have organised themselves for an optimal economic outcome. 
Good research would certainly feed into good teaching but, if lecturers devoted all 
their time to research and little time to student contact that might cause difficulty. 
 
The effects of RAE and of TQA mean that imagination, variety, difference, are all 
subject to a process of standardisation, which is one of the more unfortunate effects of 
any quality assessment system. In order to produce an assessment of quality it is 
necessary to set a standard. It is therefore not surprising that marking people at such a 
standard and encouraging a standard should begin to provide more of a unitary 
measure and therefore more of a unitary result. Perhaps, then, the attempt of The 
Higher Education Funding Council for perfectly good reasons to achieve the raising 
of standards of teaching quality in higher education had some effect after all. Both 
Roger Brownsword and Tony Bradney have written critically on the nature of this 
effect within law. Dawn Oliver has also written on how a Law School might organise 
more positively to deal with these processes. Since the intention was to assess each 
law department against its own statement of objectives, the attempt was clearly made 
to allow for a plurality of approaches, something missed by many of the writers. Even 
so, the fact of assessment and any external influence would be likely to produce a 
narrower range of activity, as those assessed would be performing to a perceived set 
of expectations. These Funding Council initiatives have therefore had considerable 
effect on Law Schools as part of the University system. 
 
Law Schools, Law Departments, Law Programmes, Law Institutes, Law Centres and 
Law Faculties, as they seem to be variously called (I will, if I may, refer to all of these 
together "Law Schools"), have never sat easily within the world of the rest of the 
Academy. Twining gloriously quotes Robert Maynard Hutchins, President of the 
University of Chicago, in his general view that a university is "an aggregation of 
sovereignties connected by a common heating plant". Experience of law within 
universities across the world shows an uneasy relationship based on a set of 
dichotomies. Law, for examples, considers itself "special". Other University Faculties 
consider law as "different". 
 
In halls of Senates and university committees lawyers are considered nit-picking and 
sometimes unprincipled because they will argue both sides of a matter. Lawyers find 
others unanalytical, unobjective and scientists too right wing. 
 
University administrators consider law as a low cost subject whose popularity can 
make it a money spinner. Law teachers on the other hand feel their students need 
more exposure to them, and therefore more money spent on staffing rather than less. 
The new movement towards skills teaching involves behavioural learning and 
assessment which cannot be done in large classes. 
 
The culture of this academic tribe, Becher’s concept, is also different. Traditionally 
lawyers have been inward looking, reductive in their thinking and concerned 
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principally, if not only, with the internal discipline of arcane structures, ex-post facto 
rationalisations and the precedential weight of hoary judgements; in short with 
description of "detail" Academics in the humanities and social sciences are renewed 
by contact across disciplines, by the wider context of open discussion and the 
challenge of change and all that is new; with "overview". A course on the law of 
contract for example does not often start with the recognition that the contract is a 
system for organising the reliability of business or economic transfer. A course on 
contract begins with the detail of what constitutes offer and acceptance and ends with 
how to go about enforcement. 
 
Lawyers are seen as narrow and sometimes as unchallenging, unenquiring and 
unimaginative. Scientists seem to see the lawyers as lacking in empiricism and their 
own brand of rationality. The world of law, fashioned as it is by lawyers and judges 
and drafters of legislation is seen as very different from the natural world of scientific 
study. 
 
Of course, they all need lawyers. But they do not really want us as colleague 
academics. They want us as practitioners of the law. Educational academics, for 
example, want us to tell them about the new law of education, scientists want us to tell 
them about how to avoid copyright or health and safety problems. They want us; they 
see us, as practitioners and not as academics. This is, of course, also true of other 
"professional schools" such as medicine, accountancy, business and architecture as 
well. We are not alone in this, but it needs to be recognised. We can create legal 
knowledge but not a transportable discipline - we have more to learn from other 
disciplines to help us with our law than they can gain from the discipline of law as 
opposed to its content. 
 
Can we be more like them? Can we learn from them? Do we want to? In a major 
study by Professor Phil Thomas of Cardiff he tracks the success of the socio-legal 
movement in the UK, by looking at its effect on law school courses and in research 
carried on by legal academics. Though few have been formally trained in socio-legal 
techniques it is clear that the study of law from the point of view of other disciplines 
has taken firm root, and has passed into mainstream legal subjects. This seems to be 
confirmed by Harris s and Jones. 
 
In an article entitled "Law Schools Without Lawyers?" Professor Lilly goes 
further.He identifies three possible broad approaches to the study and teaching of law: 
the first approach concerns the practical or operational aspects of law; the second 
approach relates to the "doctrinal" which he says is analytical rigour applied in a legal 
context, searching for rules, rule systems and underlying principles in legal materials; 
the third approach to law is the "theoretical". He quotes Professor Judge Posner, 
perhaps the strongest of the law and economics writers in the United States in 
suggesting that the doctrinalists are being pushed from centre stage by "economic 
analysts of law, by other social scientists of law, by Bayesians, by philosophers of 
law, by critical legal scholars … and critical race theorists, all deploying the tools of 
non-legal disciplines". And so, at least from the point of view of a doctrinalist, the 
success of the "theoretical" movement, by which he seems to mean openness to, and 




Will Bo Peep then find her sheep this way? If she does, will they be the same sheep 
with which she left the meadow? Many of the benefits are well portrayed implicitly in 
Phil Thomas’ work. What Professor Lilly seems to miss is that the good socio-legal 
scientist, the good critical lawyer, the good legal philosopher, critical race theorist etc. 
are all people who are good lawyers as well and perhaps as William Kunstler (the 
American Civil Liberties lawyer) once said "good lawyers first". They do not 
diminish law and the teaching of law by applying law to other disciplines or by 
applying other disciplines to law. On the contrary, they have the tremendous capacity 
to enrich law, its nature and the understanding of law among all law scholars, law 
students and the wider academic community. 
 
So, if what the rest of the Academy has to offer is interdisciplinary studies there 
would seem to be some major advantages, although some might be concerned about 
the scale of such movements in recent years. If there are advantages, it is then sad that 
so many law faculties involved in undergraduate legal education still stick to 
themselves within the Academy, have their own libraries, for fear of contamination by 
other alien knowledge or disciplines; have their own buildings, refuse to be engaged 
in more general socio-legal institutional academic enterprise and in general declare 
their separation from the rest of the university. 
 
Should we be there inside the Academy? Or should we simply be the trade schools for 
the profession? It could be said that accountants and medics do not necessarily show 
any better attitude to understanding the rest of the world outside of their own 
disciplines. Is this a problem of professional schools and not of the discipline of law 
itself? 
 
It is interesting to compare our own with the system of legal education in continental 
Europe. Their systems are often said to be so much more fashioned to produce 
practising lawyers, judges and legal officials. They often have classes of thousands of 
students, perhaps three quarters of whom will never make it through all the 
examinations and graduate to become lawyers. Leo and Paul Torremans show how 
"supporting" courses in philosophy, psychology, sociology, economics, political and 
social history, epistemology, logic and ethics and language courses are all compulsory 
elements of the first two years of law study at Belgian Universities. According to 
Philip Leith, writing on "Legal Education in Germany" a full 3½ months worth of 
courses must be taken from the Wahlfachgruppen, or electives including sociology of 
law, philosophy, criminology - although also included in this list is international law. 
 
Perhaps more than medicine and accountancy, law has been able to stand outside and 
look at itself with the vantage points provided by cognate disciplines. Law schools, 
legal research and law teaching have all been immensely refreshed by this approach. 
The openness of fresh ideas have blown through the windows of law schools and 
scattered some of the growing moss and gathering dust that went with a Dickensian 
view of law. Any new vantage point is good, provided that the study is aimed at law, 
its nature, its effects, its practice, or its theory. And nobody seems to be claiming that 
the new theoreticians are not considering law itself. So questions of how far the 
pendulum has swung apart, one should applaud what has been gained from the rest of 
the Academy, even though it may often have been an uneasy relationship. 
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Some sheep may be found here and brought home safely. Why not all? There are 
some limits to the theoretical perspectives of other disciplines. Each bring alternative, 
internally coherent, but competing viewpoints. But the nature of the "theory", as 
applied, is to provide a simplified, limited understanding which may not apply beyond 
the basic assumptions and language of each individual approach or context. So we 




What about the discipline of education specifically? Some law teachers have recently 
written that the main problems with legal education are that it is all about "legal" and 
not very much about "education". It does not take into account the major changes that 
have occurred in the discipline of education, in its theory and practice (see principally 
Fiona Cownie, Julian Webb, Julie Macfarlane). 
 
A number of streams seem to have gathered together here at one confluence - teaching 
quality assessment and evaluation; legal skills; learning as opposed to teaching; 
formative assessment to promote learning; learning from experience; clarified 
learning objectives; learning outcomes; analysis of competencies; standardisation 
through learning and teaching standards; NVQ’ism and teaching design. Each of these 
merits specific treatment beyond the space available. But it is possible to say a few 
words about their joint effect on legal education. 
 
Apart from Fiona Cownie’s almost lone voice in this country, it has been the skills 
school largely which has promoted the educational discipline as a teaching approach. 
Academics and teachers interested in educating legal skills and promoting good 
lawyering behaviours such as Phil Jones, Julie McFarlane, Julian Webb have also 
promoted more of a competence based approach to teaching and assessment, looking 
at learning outcomes, objectively measurable systems of assessment, learning 
objectives, and all the other concepts and argot of the new educational theory. Many 
such theoreticians emanated from a background of degree standardisation that was 
part of the old polytechnic system, as Richard Grimes shows in his Research Report 
on "Legal Skills and Clinical Legal Education" . 
 
The need to provide standards within a more educationally professional approach, and 
especially objective standards, seems to me to be a statement about circumstances. It 
means that society feels it can no more rely on the individuals themselves or 
individual institutions, their education, training, ethos and system of socialisation to 
provide an appropriate level, but an outside body needs to assess and police this. 
Often a move to standardised assessment as under the old CNAA is the result of 
pressures on a system which otherwise would have been relied on to perform 
appropriately. 
 
Movements towards standardised assessment have assisted this process of movement 
towards educational professionalism. It was already present to some extent in the 
university system through external examiners and possibility of monitoring by the 
Law Society Then, as already mentioned the Higher Education Funding Councils for 
England, Wales and Scotland decided upon both a teaching quality assessment and 
research assessment. The teaching quality assessment in particular attempted to utilise 
the new educational concepts of objectives, outcomes and competencies. 
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Although the world of educational studies covers much more and perhaps more 
interesting, concepts, information and ideas, it has been these particular concepts of 
objectives, outcomes and competencies which have been taken to be important by 
those who have written within legal education about the discipline of education. Steve 
Nathanson’s piece on the Culture of Design is an example of an attempt to push legal 
educators to think more rationally and carefully, more analytically and more 
imaginatively about the educational enterprise in which they are involved, along the 
lines shown to us by the educationalists. 
 
The question is: is this useful? Will Bo Peep find the rest of her sheep easily in this 
way. Will the tide of the new educational philosophy bring them home, carrying their 
tails behind them, without law schools needing to do anything? 
 
I wish to make some personal comments in a carefully measured way about the skills 
and competencies and learning outcomes approach. Although what I am about to say 
is probably true for other disciplines as well, I believe it to be more so for work within 
professional disciplines. An outcomes or competencies based approach is useful, but 
it is only so useful. We must actively seize the opportunity this approach provides of 
beginning to analyse whole areas of information, and understanding where the 
elements of such analysis are beginning to be available. We must take upon ourselves, 
as researchers and teachers, the beginnings of this job of observing carefully what is 
involved in what we are trying to teach law students and how we would like them to 
end up. 
 
On the other hand, it is absolutely clear that this work is endless and will never be 
complete or absolute. Progression (including within my own work) is often by wave 
upon wave of reductive lists of skills. There is only a certain amount of information or 
analysis which can be reduced to an outcomes or competencies basis and be measured 
as such. Professor Twining’s upcoming review of Le Brun and Johnstone states this in 
a rather nice way. He says learning outcomes are "all fine, provided you don’t 
actually believe in them". 
 
Both sides of this argument seem to me to be correct. The job has to be done. The 
work of understanding what it is we are trying to teach, has to be progressed and 
made more and more complete. This is a job which is worth doing and one to which I 
have devoted some considerable time. It is worth doing because it tells us more and 
more about the subject we describe and therefore more and more about what we are 
aiming to teach. On the other hand, there will always be something missing - which 
will defy this "bureaucratic rationalist" approach as Twining calls it. 
 
I do not think that it is elitist to say that there are elements of the work of law which 
will be too difficult to render down into a set of simple, objective statements against 
which we can then measure our students. Law is complex, it exists in a "real" world 
with all the complexities that brings and it is not susceptible in its entirety to the 
minimalistic NVQ’ism which is currently being forced upon it. I believe this to be 
true in relation to the vocational stage and beyond, but also in relation to the effect 
this approach is having on the undergraduate sector. 
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I find it worrying because I believe it is necessary to form the analysis, the analysis 
should then inform our teaching and assessment. BUT this will be insufficient to 
measure the performance of students or legal work beyond a basic threshold of 
competence. In addition, such standards often seem to be used only as a reactive and 
backward looking process. Teaching and research should be capable of being 
transformative and developmental; involving an implicit critique of historical norms 
and enabling not just "understanding" but also change where necessary. Any attempt 
to press ahead with the NVQ approach beyond the lower levels of understanding of 
what is involved in law and legal work will not be either useful or effective. Although 
it may appear as if a system of assessment has been set up and that an accommodation 
of interests has been reached between jobless law graduates and the organised legal 
profession. The pressure for this, which seems to be coming from parts of the Law 
Society and supported by some items within ACLEC’s First Report on Legal 
Education, seems intended to produce a form of para-legal underclass, to carry out the 
repetitive work of law, at a lower cost; thereby employing the ranks of law graduates 
who have not been able to obtain pupillage or training places - but not giving them the 
qualification or wage packet of fully fledged lawyers. 
 
This pressure has also been bolstered by the circumstances of the sudden growth in 
the numbers of skills teachers at the vocational stage, generated by the new vocational 
courses - BVC and LPC. Almost overnight a large cadre of skills teachers had to be 
created to perform this function. Previously, skills teachers had come from the ranks 
of clinicians. Their approach was born of the need to create law students who could 
carry out legal work for the poor with minimal experience. They intended to promote 
in their students the ethics of care and understanding of their client community. 
Teaching legal skills was part of an holistic, caring approach to legal work, not a 
routinised, sanitised set of statements on a sheet of A4. It was not possible to recreate 
the strength, the caring warmth and other effects of the clinical movement, or even, 
some would say, good skills teachers, in such a short time. We seem to have retained 
the form, but not the content, or the feeling, or the learning environment of experience 
of the real client. This has affected undergraduate legal education also by presenting 
poor models of skills and what skills teaching has to offer. 
 
So, there seem to be dangers as well as major advantages in looking for guidance 
from this area of the discipline of education. It must be useful to be more analytical 
about what we teach, to be more purposeful, more clear and more objective in the 
manner in which we assess our students. But, none of this needs to lead to an 
obsessive reductionism or an uncritical approach to what we analyse, or to a belief 
that all we can analyse today is all that is there. And it should not blind us to all the 
good things we can also learn from the discipline of education: including learning 
from experience, about techniques in adult learning, student centred learning, the 
sociology of education and much more. A blind following of learning outcome 
measurement as a new holy grail is probably not among these. Bo Peep must be 
careful about finding these sheep - they might all end up looking rather like Dolly the 
clone. 
 
Law Schools - Navel Contemplation 
 
Should law schools look inwardly to themselves for direction? Should law schools 
relax in the expectation that they can find their guidance at home because the nursery 
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rhyme says the sheep will return their without assistance. This form of navel 
contemplation will not for everyone be useful, attractive or elegant. Experience of 
some very different law schools suggests that some may profitably look within for the 
range of knowledge, information, approaches, methods, subject areas, experience that 
is really necessary in order to consider future planning. But others would implode. 
Tearing each other to bits, arguing over a constantly decreasing cake has already 
become the pattern of the last five years. The changes which will affect the future of 
law, the future of the legal profession and the future of legal education are not, or not 
only, held within the law school and its library. If we wish to study and understand 
these we must do more than look inwardly. And if we only look inwardly we will fail 
to understand the dimensions and nature of change and its impact on what we do. The 
message which lay behind Professor Hepple’s Inaugural Lecture in Cambridge last 
year, "trust the universities" must mean trust them to make the right decisions and in 
the right way. If all it means is allowing law teachers to do what they want to do, or 
get involved in massive internal wrangles, this will not be enough. 
 
So what can the law schools do by looking within? One thing they can do, which was 
a part of what occurred during the Funding Council Teaching Quality Assessment 
Exercise, is to look within for examples of all that is best about legal education. 
Excellent teaching, imaginative ideas and positive learning are, at this moment, a part 
of what is happening in a law school around the corner. But what law teacher would 
dream of walking in on someone else’s lecture to see how they performed. This does 
sometimes occur as a policing mechanism to check on people applying for what used 
to be tenure or senior lectureships, if not higher. But it is surely something that law 
teachers should, in general, do to learn how to be a law teacher. More thought needs 
to be given on how to encourage discussion of such issues and opportunities for 
developing good models through mentoring systems and the like. There needs also to 
be occasions for appropriate encouragement of new ideas and the easy trial of new 
methods and approaches. 
 
Steve Nathanson in his Sydney paper argues for a "culture of design" which allows 
these elements of good teaching to be accorded the same level of importance as other 
areas of research. A culture of educational design might mean that law teachers spend 
more time learning on the job, like professional practitioners nowadays in continuing 
education, about how best to perform their work of teaching. Lets send all the teachers 
back to school, within the school. It seems as if Dearing will be suggesting something 
like this anyway. But, it should not be organised as a disciplinary mechanism or as an 
assessment mechanism, but as a mechanism of mutual development. Both new and 
old teachers need continuing development. Such a system of mutual development 
might include groups of teachers in similar subject areas sitting in on each other’s 
lectures, seminars, tutorials or workshops, discussing not only substantive issues, 
legal doctrine, multi-disciplinary approaches; but also ideas for getting across difficult 
concepts, for encouraging student learning and enabling and for freshening up their 
pedagogy. In this way looking inside the law school will be useful. 
 
There are other things which need to be done inside the law school, but not just by 
learning from within. Information systems within the law school, which includes all 
of the library, CD-Roms, on line systems, the Internet etc, need to be thought through 
carefully and Information Technology needs to be properly financed. Lack of finance 
is by no means the fault of the law schools themselves. But lack of movement into an 
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understanding of the new world of the law, perhaps that suggested by Professor 
Richard Susskind of Strathclyde University in his recent book "The Future of Law" is 
the fault of the Law Schools. I do not entirely agree with him about the way in which 
changes will take place, but that information technology will change the nature of law 
and the nature of the way lawyers practise I have no doubt. Understanding this first 
simply for the purposes of education and research is essential within the law school of 
the future, and it must come from within, assisted of course by the excellent work that 
Warwick University’s CTI Law Technology Centre has done. 
 
So Little Bo Peep may need to do some work to get those of her sheep at home into 
the right condition. 
 
The Legal Profession 
 
Where else can Little Bo Beep look? She can also look to the legal profession. She 
can clearly look there both in terms of the new systems of vocational training for the 
legal profession and in terms of the continuing legal education which now takes place 
there. 
 
But, has this paper not now turned full circle? Isn’t the profession itself as a system of 
training, and as a purpose for education, exactly what law teachers have been reacting 
against for so many years? 
 
"Teachers in their turn grew tired of lecturing to empty benches, and tended to treat 
their educational function as a tiresome appendage to their practice, from which their 
livelihood was mainly derived. In a word teachers and students alike became content 
merely to go through the motions of observing the stringent and salutory medieval 
requirements" 
 
These words are not a description of a modern legal education, although they could 
have been said about many a 1960s or 1970s law school. They in fact detail how the 
earlier system of legal education in the Inns of Court failed in the first part of the 
seventeenth century. The position which Hanbury describes is not the position now. In 
the 25 years since this author’s undergraduate legal education, law teachers have 
become a profession of their own, as described by Rick Abel in his seminal work on 
the "Legal Profession of England and Wales". Work at the Bar, as the inevitable 
concomitant of a teaching post, has long disappeared. They were the bad old days 
when some teachers would only dash into the university for their lectures when the 
Cause List permitted. But, has anything been lost in this transition? 
 
The propositions of modern university legal education that law is a science, as 
proposed by the Harvard Case Method, or that law is a social science as proposed by 
Yale are all reactions against a trade school approach. Should one agree with Lilly 
that we have gone too far towards the university? This author’s position is that we 
have not gone far enough towards inter-disciplinary studies and we have not gone far 
enough towards "theory" and we have also not gone far enough towards 
understanding, analysing, developing and "forming" the legal profession. 
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Looking to the legal profession both as a purpose, and for guidance, for legal 
education is quite clearly not a new idea. It lay behind the old Inns of Court system 
and is still the clear approach of the more "black letter" law schools 
 
So, looking to the profession is largely what undergraduate legal education has done 
up until this time. In fact, the legal profession has all but designed the core of 
undergraduate programmes by defining the ingredients of a qualifying law degree, 
usually constituting over half of the syllabus. Professor Peter Birk’s article in the 
Webb Journal on the permanence of the core complains that it will still be necessary 
to teach basic material at a very low level as a result of even the current system of 
proscription. But the release is much greater than he imagines. This is despite the now 
evident lack of monitoring confirmed by the Nick Saunder’s article already 
mentioned. Despite also the slow relaxation of the rules themselves, the involvement 
of the professions, their ability to make decisions about what happens in university 
law schools, and the nature of those decisions and what they proscribe have all been 
the subject matter of more material written about English legal education than almost 
anything else. A good deal of it comes from Professor Birks himself, who feels very 
strongly about the CPE (the conversion course) which enables non lawyers to take a 
one year programme having obtained a non law degree in order to then qualify to do 
either a Bar Vocational Course or the Legal Practice Course for solicitors. 
 
The Power of Professor Birk’s invective is high. In his l995 article in the Webb 
Journal of Current Legal Issues entitled, "Compulsory Subjects; Will the Seven 
Foundations ever crumble?", he says: 
 
"…and the CPE conversion, which is tied to the compulsory list, opens the gates to 
floods of otherwise unemployable non-law graduates pouring in. "The Treasury 
interest is easy to read, as also that of the university bosses to whom legal education is 
a product which sometimes makes best profits downmarket. They have been very 
badly led". 
 
The CPE, whose rules, syllabus and examination system are set by the professions, is 
in a sense a testing ground for what is absolutely essential to learn, in order to become 
a lawyer. The Birksian school considers this to be a possible, easy backdoor to 
studying law since many non lawyers will not have had to obtain the same high level 
of passes at ‘A’ level which are necessary to secure a place at university for the study 
of law. The CPE then, and the "law core", have been the major political battleground. 
But this does not answer the question "why did they need to be the major intellectual 
battleground for legal education?" 
 
It is clear that they did not. 
 
Perhaps it was because so much time and effort was spent in fighting the chimera of 
the dastardly legal professions who wished to control everything that the law schools 
did not really have enough time to think about the form or content of the intellectual 
pursuit which they would otherwise have preferred. Of course it is not true to say that 
no law schools thought about this. The University of Kent and the University of 
Warwick, followed by a number of others, made sounds long ago that they were 
unsatisfied not just about the political control but also about the subject matter. 
Somehow or other, agreements were reached by them with the professions and it did 
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not seem to be a problem. It is only now that all the other law schools are released 
from these great bonds with which the profession bound them, that it is clear that, for 
the present at least, we have not yet developed a proper mind of our own. 
 
It is suggested that there is another reason why the profession was able to dictate for 
so long and why the pattern of its dictation was so strongly adhered to. This thesis is 
fairly simple, and outside the enclosed world of legal education, it would obvious. 
The study of law is not the study of a naturally existing set of phenomena, but it is the 
study of what is legislated as law, what judges pronounce as law, what is practised as 
law, the effects of those laws and that practice and the context within which the law 
and its practice operates. I shall refer to all of these as "the work of law" since it deals 
with how law works and how law is worked. 
 
It is argued first that law should be studied as a science or as a social science, but that 
study itself is still of those items just mentioned. It attempts to build an analysis and a 
rationality around, from, or within the vagaries of the "work of law". It can be quite 
distanced from the "work of law" in its standpoint, in its approach, and in the 
relaxation with which it contemplates the issues which hit lawyers at a fast rate in the 
vicissitudes of practice. But it is still studying the work of law. Whether it is statute or 
judge made law, it is a man or woman made product and how the men and women 
make that product is an essential element also of this study. It can be studied 
separately. It can be differentiated from the "pure science" but it cannot be ignored. 
 
Secondly, most students who come to study law at universities, even if only 42% will 
make it into the practicing profession nowadays, usually still do so with one major 
purpose in mind. They want to study law. That includes what I have called "the work 
of law". Most of them actually do wish to become professional lawyer even though in 
the current economic climate they may not succeed. Some will become law teachers. 
Others will use their law in different ways, but still need to know about the work of 
law. Yet others still, probably a fairly small proportion of those who start off 
intending to study law, will study it without actually using it subsequently in the 
context of the world of knowledge or the world of work (if those are different). 
 
The massive mismatch between the expectations and desires of law teachers and law 
students in the United States and in the UK as exposed by Macfarlane, Jeeves and 
Boon and more recently by Leighton, Mortimer and Whatley is based on this 
difficulty. Law students want to learn what will be useful to them, including 
knowledge for its own sake, including ethical approaches to law including the 
humanity of law, including socio-legal studies and including the work of law. Law 
teachers seem to feel that they need to react against this rather than using it as a 
driving force to motivate studies and courses and programmes and the work of 
individual students. Law students want to learn about law, and the work of law 
includes an understanding of the practice of law. 
 
Therefore, it is suggested that the professions were able to proscribe not only because 
of the politics of the situation, but also because they deal with the work of the law 
which is a major subject of study in any law degree. It is not just the politics of 
control, but the inherent nature of the subject matter which reflects knowledge of what 
is happening in the world of the work of law. The challenge then of legal education is 
to harness the forces of the profession, the work of law and student interest and 
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motivation all together to carry out the higher level of intellectual achievement which 
is essential for the production of better lawyers; by which I mean better academic 
lawyers, better practitioners, better judges, better prosecutors, better defence lawyers 
and better law students. Not to fight these interests but to harness them. 
 
Academic colleagues should not misunderstand. This is not a sell out to the profession 
and professional bodies, but a recognition of what already is the basis of our subject 
matter and of student interest and student expectations. It does not assist us to get hot 
under the collar in ivory, redbrick, or even "60’s brutalist" towers about the politics, 
for they seem to follow the reality. 
 
Now that the law schools are almost released from this imagined hegemony we find 
ourselves about to self-impose something not too dissimilar. Many are saying if we do 
not have some guidance, some standards, some "core" how will we know what is a 
law degree and what is not? Now that we have that responsibility and do not find 
ourselves simply tilting at windmills elsewhere, we need to make some decisions 
which have to take into account some of the real issues involved in the work of law. 
 
Not only is taking account of the concerns of the legal profession and legal 
professional work an appropriate approach for the reasons stated above, in developing 
legal education, but undergraduate legal education now has much to learn from the 
education and training that goes on at the vocational stage and for qualified lawyers. 
Two obvious elements which have already made their way up into undergraduate 
legal education are elements of skills teaching and workshop based teaching methods. 
Elsewhere I have expressed that there are limits to the current state of skills teaching 
in general, because it has been taken as a new orthodoxy which it is imagined can 
cover and control everything. Skills teaching is not the teaching or study of law, 
neither is it something that can be just picked up over a summers break. Nevertheless, 
as a pioneer of skills teaching within undergraduate legal education in this country I 
am convinced of the great worth of both this approach and the importance of the 
subject matter involved in understanding the work of law and in producing high 
quality lawyers: both professional and academic. 
 
What then is the skills approach really about? It is a reaction to a previous system of 
legal education in which somebody entered the programme at age 18, went through 
three years of undergraduate legal education, one year of vocational course, and two 
years of articles (or one year of pupillage) without anybody articulating clearly what 
they were supposed to be taught and when. This author’s own undergraduate legal 
education may serve as an example. We would learn the four subjects in the first year, 
the four subjects in the second year and the four subjects including perhaps a project 
in the third year. Nobody would conceptualise to students or at least openly articulate 
what the end product was supposed to be like, what sort of a law student or lawyer 
they wanted to end up with. All that was suggested was that we had to do certain 
subjects. 
 
It became impossible to organise legal education on that basis when the amount of 
law pouring out of Parliament and the courts became too much to handle. At one 
point, nobody could from then on be well versed in the gamut of law. At that point it 
became essential to analyse not what subject matter was important but what concepts 
were important in law and what legal skills were necessary in order to deal with any 
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subject matter which law could today, or in the future, provide. So, at the point where 
specialisation became essential for lawyers, so did conceptualisation and skills 
training become essential for legal education and law students. 
 
"As the law became more complex… the final remnants of the mid-20th century 
notion that Law Schools could somehow teach in three years all the law a lawyer 
would need to know were reduced to ash. The emphasis of legal education…has 
finally and fully shifted to teaching fundamental legal principles and philosophies, 
perspectives on law’s place in society and the thought processes and judgements 
inherent to lawyering. The intent is to graduate lawyers who will be capable and 
flexible learners and practitioners in a remarkably wide variety of settings". 
 
Understanding the essential concepts leads to an understanding of what is essential 
about law and the work of law. Identifying essential elements, for the first time 
allowed the possibility of teaching those items directly, rather than imagining that 
they would happen to be there in the mind of the educational product, the law student, 
at the end of the period of legal education. So, "skills teaching" is the product of a 
rational analysis of what is essential to be learned, and then a direct form of teaching 
of what is found to be essential or of importance. This also explains the reason why 
skills teaching can never be everything that legal education is about. And it goes some 
way to explaining why competencies and learning outcomes can never be stated to an 
absolute finality. There will always be the ineffable, the indescribable, the 
uncapturable, that which is left to discretion. And such elements may not be capable 
of easy capture or easy reduction to simplified objective statement. 
 
In fact, often what they will miss out will be what academics will consider to be 
"essence" or "crux"; that which drives intellectually a consideration of a subject area 
of a matter, of a problem or of a theory. It may well be that the element which is 
indescribable, will remain the major area of lawyer activity, when some of what is 
involved in practice will move to a de-skilled computerised function. So we must 
retain what is missing in a listed skills analysis and of course work to analyse it 
further but never expect to be able to reach the top of that mountain. 
 
Skills, therefore have provided a healthy approach to clarity, effectiveness, certainty 
and objectivity in legal education across the board. They have coalesced some of the 
educational discipline approaches mentioned above and they have provided a new 
vantage point from which to review both teaching and the curriculum in the context of 
a vastly changing profession and body of law. But, most important of all, because of 
their provenance within professional legal studies they have brought into academic 
consciousness a contemplation of what is involved in the work of a lawyer and in the 
work of law. Thus they have provided a purpose, an approach, a methodology and 
also some subject matter for legal education in an area which was previously ignored 




If an overarching theme is necessary to be found for the purpose of legal education, a 
theme which can be looked for in all the places mentioned this evening, then legal 
competence might be such a theme. It is a theme that in the context of legal practice 
Professor Alan Paterson and this writer together with a team including Richard 
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Moorhead, Lisa Webley, Tammy Goriely, Helen Micallef and others have been 
working on for the last eight years. It is also a theme which has also begun to guide 
legal education in the United States in the MacCrate Report on Bridging the Gap. 
Competence has been treated as an organising principle for legal education at all 
levels in the United States, in Australia and there is now interest in this both in Europe 
and elsewhere. Why "competence" as an organising principle? Does it not sound too 
much like all the things which have already been stated are useful provided you don’t 
actually believe in them? Competence, but not necessarily competencies is useful 
because it has the ability to link all the different elements of legal education from the 
"nursery" stage of undergraduate legal education, onwards through the vocational 
stage and the post qualification stages. It is useful not only because it provides 
practical and intellectual coherence for an entire system, but also because it seems to 
transcend national and jurisdictional boundaries so as to allow easier transitions 
between, and harmonisations of, civil and common law approaches. As an overriding 
concept therefore it would allow easier migration of law between the European 
mainland and the UK. 
 
It is also probably correct at about the necessary level for what might be needed in 
terms of standardisation of curricula, syllabuses and educational objectives as 
between different law schools which now seems to be the approach of the HEFCE 
Quality Assurance initiative, post Dearing. For, if there will be no core of legal 
subject matter which must be studied for a law degree, then there must be something 
like a set of legal concepts which are essential for the legal competence of our 
students at an appropriate level. Since we are talking about a basic level of 
standardisation, to replace a core, notions of legal competence will be sufficient to 
provide an appropriate level of expectation and therefore of organisation and 
assessment. Articulated notions made up of such legal competence may never, as 
already mentioned, cover the levels of excellence at each stage. But they will do 
enough to cover the equivalent of a basis, a core, and more. If notions of competence 
can begin to be articulated for the complexity of the world of legal practice as has 
started to occur in relation to legal aid franchising, then such notions can certainly 
begin to be articulated for undergraduate legal education, and already have been by 
Phil Jones and others. 
 
If standards have to be articulated then competence appears to be a pretty good 
method of covering the basics. At the same time it does not do away with the more 
imaginative levels of higher intellectual thought, which can be operated differentially 
over a range of educational approaches and policies and subject matter in different 
institutions. By and large the literature of legal competence derives from literature on 
the profession. But that does not seem to be a good reason to reject it. Competence 
can provide an overarching set of values which can make links between different parts 
of legal education, but is not tied to singular methods of assessment and allows for 
more abstract, more subjective and more discretionary elements as well as a basic, 
objective standard. 
 
What else has the profession shown us, or given us? Its system of continuing 
professional development (CPD), the continuation of vocational work into the 
Professional Skills Course, and the further continuation throughout practice life of 
continuing professional development have all been constructed as part of a system of 
lifetime learning, rather than a system of training and qualification in which 
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everything is delivered at the beginning. Previously, everything had to be learned at 
University, at the vocational course, or during articles, since there was no formal 
training whatsoever afterwards. That presented a considerable amount of pressure for 
undergraduate legal education and for the vocational element. It could never hope to 
deliver a lifetime’s worth of information, concepts, skills, approaches or ideas. Instead 
there was an assumed expectation that practitioners would learn from experience, and 
that learning from experience was bound to be beneficial. 
 
Oscar Wilde, for example, says "Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to 
remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught". But, 
this is not so. In some research as yet unpublished, shown in relation to client 
interviewing that experience by itself is not a good educator. Often, if it teaches at all, 
it teaches badly. Many learn from watching others, or from the needs of practice, how 
to perform poorly. The old system of watching a more senior practitioner in articles 
could often have this affect. Even if the practitioner was good at his or her work, they 
may not have been a good teacher. Hence, the importance in this area of literature of 
the new concept of the "reflective" practitioner. This reflective practitioner of Donald 
Schön is the one who can best learn from experience during the normal period of 
apprenticeship and early work, i.e. whilst in circumstances of little formal training, or 
little monitoring accented to training, rather than the supervision of work. 
 
But there are reasons why it is difficult to be a reflective practitioner, a good learner 
from experience. Legal practice is organised around the business of business, around 
the needs of making a living for those who work in the work of law, and for making 
profits for those who can. Legal Aid fees, at least when they rise at all, costs awarded 
by courts, fees for transactional deals all are now predicated upon a clarity that law is 
a business, and not an altruistic professional past-time for the good all rounder who 
happened to like standing on his or her hind legs in front of a bench. At a time when 
altruism could be afforded or considered in relation to client work, one supposes it 
may also have been considered in relation to the training of new lawyers in work. 
(Although intuitively one knows that training was much more haphazard then). Now, 
the vicissitudes of practice do not allow for time for each person to think, reflect and 
learn from each experience they have. In fact the driving power of the taxi meter and 
the need to produce a product at a reasonable cost makes this reflection all the harder. 
So a system of lifelong learning such as CPD enables the possibility of a more formal 
reflection to occur in the context of a learning environment, whilst inside practice. 
The business jargon of the "learning corporation" is obviously a very similar concept. 
We are importing it late into law. 
 
How does this leave the law school? Until this point this paper refers, to legal 
education only as meaning what goes on in the undergraduate law school. Professor 
Twining refers to this as the "nursery years" and the primary school approach - a part 
excuse for my use of a nursery rhyme character to portray the problems of 
undergraduate legal education, in its search for meaning and purpose. Legal education 
is of the nursery variety in this country, because our students, unlike those in North 
America and parts of Europe do not take another undergraduate degree before they 
move on to study law. Even in the United States where lawyers are postgraduates 




"All I ever needed to know about teaching law school, I learned teaching 
Kindergarten: introducing gaming techniques into the law school classroom". 
 
But it is also "nursery education" because university law schools have not faced up to 
an understanding of what a new system or approach to learning - life long learning 
will mean to them. This is not just a release from the pressure of having to provide 
everything at one go, right at the beginning of someone’s career, to last them for the 
next 40 years. It is also a major opportunity to be involved in the continuing learning 
that must occur in the life of each law practitioner. Practice needs the academy far 
beyond the nursery stage. The links which occur in North America at the higher level 
between the profession and the academy, between the bench and the academy and the 
easier movement between all of these are essential features also to be fostered in the 
UK. 
 
In summary, undergraduate law schools need to take some lead from the profession in 
terms of organising the future of legal education. This means adopting some of the 
new techniques and approaches which professional legal education has adopted. It 
also means taking account of the changes in professional legal education and training 
and continuing legal education, in order to know what to teach and how to teach at the 
undergraduate level. But, it also means that law schools should take account of their 
important role as the possible providers of legal education from the cradle to the grave 
This might equate with Twining’s ILC or International Legal Centre. This is not 
because law schools should have their snouts in the training trough, although such 
funding will undoubtedly be useful, but because the profession actually needs the 
overview, the distance, the perspective, the dispassionate observation, the brain power 
and the teaching ability which, as a package, only the law schools can provide. 
 
If this is correct, why has it not happened yet? There are some 65,000 practising 
solicitors who will all by November l998 need 16 hours of compulsory continuing 
legal education a year. About half of these numbers are currently involved in 
continuing legal education. This will occur throughout the country in the midst, 
perhaps, of the greatest changes ever in organisation, management and subject matter 
of the legal profession. How is it that the law schools are not already providing this 
service and from doing so, learning more, at least as much as the profession can 
provide, about the work of law? The roots of this problem lie deep. The profession 
distrusts the universities, as being full of myopic individuals without an understanding 
of life in the real world. The law schools and the academy distrust the profession as a 
group of financially motivated entrepreneurs who have little interest in anything of 
intellectual value especially if it makes no money. 
 
Each is secretly a little jealous of the other and would quite like either more serious 
intellectual inquiry plus a little more freedom, or the importance of client 
responsibility and a little more money. From having existed in both worlds it is 
possible to say that the people in each are not as different as they think, in general, 
from the people in the other. As subjects become more interdisciplinary and as 
academics seek to learn more about the context and more about the socio-legal study 
of the areas in which legal work is carried out and of the work which lawyers do, 
there is more need of contact for the purposes of both research and teaching between 
academics and practitioners at all levels. Being involved in training will provide that 
link and research opportunities which the academic world needs and the training 
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opportunities which the practitioner world needs. As the most senior tranche of 
practitioners comes on stream into CPD by November 1998, a group whose memories 
of legal education might have faded, but which is strongly tied in to the university 
model, this is a time to be seized by both. 
 
Perhaps the rest of the sheep have been found. But what else can a long look towards 
the legal profession provide. It is suggested that it will provide a completely new 
model of practice for which the new generation of lawyers will need to be educated. 
This writer is currently in the process of completing the second edition of a book on 
Client Interviewing and Client Handling. Considering what was necessary to put in 
the new edition written 10 years after the first, it is clear that a completely new 
approach to this area of legal work had to be considered. The first edition seemed to 
be written with the basic assumption that each client’s matter, or file, or case, would 
be looked after by the same lawyer from the first interview and taking instructions, all 
the way through until the final disposition of the case. Ten years on this is no more the 
predominant model of legal services delivery. Elsewhere, and in a previous Inaugural 
Lecture and this has been discussed. Industrialisation, de-professionalisation and de-
skilling have come to the work of law. One takes little joy in the realisation of this 
prediction. But since it has now happened, it has been necessary to write an extra 
chapter for the Client Interviewing book to try to cover this changing model. Though 
there may well have been a lot wrong with Dickensian lawyering and with the Soames 
Forsyte character of Galsworthy, fossilised management structures, poor accounting 
and little service in some parts of the world of solicitors, it is still sad that legal work 
will be broken up in this way. But law is no different from banking, medicine, 
accountancy, architecture, or other professions. Work is differentiated and devolved 
down to the lowest possible category of person and moved between different 
individuals at different times. 
 
One can see how this might tie in well with approaches to life long learning within the 
profession and development over a longer period than just the university years. But 
legal education for the future must take into account what difference this may mean, 
or should mean, to the way in which lawyers are taught and the work of law is 
studied. 
 
If this is correct about the work of client interviewing, then it must also be correct 
about every other element of the work of law. 
 
As the model of legal work is different, so will legal education for legal work need to 
be different. Suskind’s view and the view of Professor Barry Dean of Linklaters and 
Paines and of the College of Law, is that these differentiated tasks will be organised 
as tasks at that level for each lawyer almost for life. So, for example one person will 
do the interviewing, or the "intake" of clients, another one will do the drafting of 
contracts, yet another do the drafting of pleadings, yet another do the negotiation, yet 
another do the advocacy etc. There will be some lawyers who will be information 
officers and some lawyers who will draft the firm’s precedents. There will be others 
who amend the precedents and yet others who use them. 
 
Although this author’s vision, or nightmare, of legal work is not very different from 
this, and some firms are already quite far down this road, there is one major 
disagreement with Barry Dean on career progression. It is suggested that different 
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lawyers will carry out these different activities at different stages in their practice 
lives and their legal development. So some people may move to work as drafters of 
precedent or legal information officers for a period and then move back to an area of 
client work and perhaps onwards to another area of management and so on. 
Apparently this is a model which Japanese companies use for their young executives, 
and one which Charles Handy mentions in the "Age of Unreason". It is suggested that 
this will become essential since the specialisation involved in the legal work, which is 
necessary for other reasons, will lead to lack of variety, by definition, and therefore a 
lack of job satisfaction unless a system of this nature evolves. 
 
So this will provide quite a new job for legal education. There will need to be a new 
vision and a major problem in conceptualisation of how to prepare, educate and train 
people for the new world of the work of law. This is a difficult enough issue to take 
over to another paper, but it is one of which all parts of legal education and training 
must now take clear account. 
 
Little Bo Peep 
 
There are five stanzas in the Little Bo Peep nursery rhyme and it may be worthwhile 
to be reminded of them. They are pretty strange and full of seeming nonsense, vague 
allusion, or some arcane symbolism which might be useful within feminist literature. 
Despite considerable research no satisfactory explanation has been found for this 
peculiar story and its meaning. 
 
Bo loses her sheep in the first stanza but is reassured that if she does nothing they will 
come home "wagging their tails behind them". Lulled into this false sense of security, 
Bo falls asleep and dreams the return of her sheep, her purpose; but she wakes to find 
them still gone. So, belatedly in the third stanza she does something active, picks up 
her crook in a determined search, one that is successful because the sheep are found, 
but unfortunately they are already damaged. They have no tails. Subsequently, she 
finds these amputated limbs, rather like a set of NVQ statements, hung out on a tree to 
dry. 
 
This seems to relieve her anxiety and in a deft act of what must by that stage have 
been limb transplant surgery, tries to repair the damage. 
 
If legal education is in the doldrums, at a crossroads, lost its way, lost its purpose, 
then it should not be too relaxed about this and about the consequences. Legal 
educators, should not fall asleep on the job, lulled into a false sense of security, the 
damage that could be done to legal education might be beyond repair. 
 
This paper has set out four different places like the four subsequent stanzas where a 
sense of purpose might be found. Each is important, each is relevant, each is useful 
and each also has its dangers. Among these the legal profession has been privileged as 
a purpose guide because legal educators ignore it at their peril. Academic colleagues 
should not misunderstand, it is not suggested that the tail should wag the sheep. 
 
So why Little Bo Peep? Twining’s allusion to the "nursery years" of undergraduate 
legal educationis mentioned above. "The Annotated Mother Goose" by William 
Baring Gould details the first publication of this nursery rhyme in l810 in the third 
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edition of a volume called "Gammer Gurton’s Garland, or the Nursery Parnassus, A 
Choice Collection Of Pretty Songs And Verses For The Amusement Of All Little 
Good Children Who Can Neither Read Nor Run". 
 
The Annotated Mother Goose remarks: 
 
"It is rather surprising that this, one of the most popular of all Mother Goose rhymes, 
does not have a longer history. Try as scholars will they cannot, to this day, find an 
earlier printed version of Little Bo Peep than that in Gammer Girton’s Garland edition 
of 1810". 
 
The first edition of Gammer Girton’s Garland was brought together by Joseph Ritson, 
who was born in 1752 in Stockton Upton Tees, Durham and "was bred to the legal 
profession" but seemed to prefer the life of English Literature. So, a lawyer at least 
brought together the first two editions of this set of nursery rhymes that eventually 
included Little Bo Peep, clearly an important part of his legal education. 
 
Equality of Opportunity 
 
Oscar Wilde began this paper, is mentioned in the middle, and perhaps should end it; 
 
"…in England, at any rate, education produces no effect whatsoever. If it did, it would 
prove a serious danger to the upper classes, and would probably lead to acts of 








Apart from the other issues raised one, other is more crucial and more pressing but 
needs a long term solution. Whatever the approach legal education takes, it must 
evince a fairness that can then be expected from the lawyers it educates and forms. 
Equality of opportunity has not yet been reached in entrance to the legal profession. 
The most recent report of the Law Society funded cohort study clearly states that 
racial discrimination is still occurring in different parts of the system of qualification 
as a lawyer. It goes on to say that there are very clear indications that class, social 
background, is of equal influence. A major effect of the great changes that have 
occurred in the system of legal education has been the incredible rise in costs for 
those who are not subsidised by large commercial firms. 
 
If an answer is not found to this we will not only be proving how true Oscar Wilde is 
about English society over a hundred years later, we will also be ensuring that there 
are no lawyers to deal with the work of the individual, and especially the less 
privileged individual who needs support from and against the State. In the new world 
of a new government, we must make immediate efforts to change this position so that 
law will never again be simply the preserve of large commercial interests or the 
wealthy. 
 20
